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The Government Economic Agenda in a Society of Unequally Rational Individuals

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  • Pavel Pelikán

Abstract

What economic roles, if any, should government play? This is still an incompletely analyzed issue that different individuals – depending on their ideologies, rent‐seeking opportunities, and analytical abilities – may answer very differently. To advance its analysis, this paper recognizes that human rationality (as empirically testable cognitive abilities) is bounded unequally across individuals, and is therefore a unique scarce resource that markets and government allocate in significantly different ways. The results conflict with ideologies of both socialism and classical liberalism, but agree with two puzzles of recent economic history and with ideological compromises in actual economic policies.

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  • Pavel Pelikán, 2010. "The Government Economic Agenda in a Society of Unequally Rational Individuals," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 231-255, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:63:y:2010:i:2:p:231-255
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.2010.00471.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Marek Hudík, 2013. "Macaulay’s Problem," ICER Working Papers 01-2013, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    2. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2015. "Behavioral political economy: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 395-417.
    3. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    4. Pavel Pelikan, 2012. "Agreeing on generalized Darwinism: a response to Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 1-8, January.

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