IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/joares/v55y2017i4p745-794.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic Growth and Financial Statement Verification

Author

Listed:
  • PETRO LISOWSKY
  • MICHAEL MINNIS
  • ANDREW SUTHERLAND

Abstract

We use a proprietary data set of financial statements collected by banks to examine whether economic growth is related to the use of financial statement verification in debt financing. Exploiting the distinct economic growth and contraction patterns of the construction industry over the years 2002–2011, our estimates reveal that banks reduced their collection of unqualified audited financial statements from construction firms at nearly twice the rate of firms in other industries during the housing boom period before 2008. This reduction was most severe in the regions that experienced the most significant construction growth. These trends reversed during the subsequent housing crisis in 2008–2011 when construction activity contracted. Moreover, using bank‐ and firm‐level data, we find a strong negative (positive) relation between audited financial statements during the growth period, and subsequent loan losses (construction firm survival) during the contraction period. Collectively, our results reveal that macroeconomic fluctuations produce temporal shifts in the overall level of financial statement verification and temporal shifts in verification are related to bank loan portfolio quality and borrower performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Petro Lisowsky & Michael Minnis & Andrew Sutherland, 2017. "Economic Growth and Financial Statement Verification," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 745-794, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:55:y:2017:i:4:p:745-794
    DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12165
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12165
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1475-679X.12165?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Minnis, 2011. "The Value of Financial Statement Verification in Debt Financing: Evidence from Private U.S. Firms," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 457-506, May.
    2. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, 2001. "Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics Or Lower Propensity To Pay?," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 14(1), pages 67-79, March.
    3. Angela Maddaloni & Jose-Luis Peydro, 2011. "Bank Risk-taking, Securitization, Supervision, and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro-area and the U.S. Lending Standards," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 2121-2165.
    4. Becker, Bo & Ivashina, Victoria, 2016. "Covenant-Light Contracts And Creditor Coordination," Working Paper Series 325, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    5. Michael Minnis & Andrew Sutherland, 2017. "Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 197-233, March.
    6. Martin Ruckes, 2004. "Bank Competition and Credit Standards," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(4), pages 1073-1102.
    7. Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2‐3), pages 367-384, March.
    8. Watts, Ross L & Zimmerman, Jerold L, 1983. "Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(3), pages 613-633, October.
    9. Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, 2011. "Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 1848-1880.
    10. Richard Lambert & Christian Leuz & Robert E. Verrecchia, 2007. "Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 385-420, May.
    11. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2010. "Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9111.
    12. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2009. "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(4), pages 1449-1496.
    13. Atif Mian & Kamalesh Rao & Amir Sufi, 2013. "Household Balance Sheets, Consumption, and the Economic Slump," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(4), pages 1687-1726.
    14. Cassar, Gavin & Ittner, Christopher D. & Cavalluzzo, Ken S., 2015. "Alternative information sources and information asymmetry reduction: Evidence from small business debt," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 242-263.
    15. Brad Badertscher & Bjorn Jorgensen & Sharon Katz & William Kinney, 2014. "Public Equity and Audit Pricing in the United States," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 303-339, May.
    16. Blackwell, DW & Noland, TR & Winters, DB, 1998. "The value of auditor assurance: Evidence from loan pricing," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 57-70.
    17. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2006. "Lending Booms and Lending Standards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(5), pages 2511-2546, October.
    18. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
    19. Elena Loutskina & Philip E. Strahan, 2011. "Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing: The Downside of Diversification," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(5), pages 1447-1480.
    20. Hans B. Christensen & Valeri V. Nikolaev & Regina Wittenberg‐Moerman, 2016. "Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 397-435, May.
    21. Berger, Philip G. & Minnis, Michael & Sutherland, Andrew, 2017. "Commercial lending concentration and bank expertise: Evidence from borrower financial statements," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 253-277.
    22. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dan Dacian Cuzdriorean, 2018. "Auditing Research: A Review Of Recent Research Advances," Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, Eurasian Publications, vol. 6(4), pages 14-26.
    2. Paul Demeré, 2023. "Is tax return information useful to equity investors?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 1413-1465, September.
    3. Sehwa Kim & Seil Kim & Anya V. Kleymenova & Rongchen Li, 2023. "Current Expected Credit Losses (CECL) Standard and Banks' Information Production," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2023-063, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Diamond, Douglas W. & Hu, Yunzhi & Rajan, Raghuram G., 2022. "Liquidity, pledgeability, and the nature of lending," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1275-1294.
    5. Raphael Duguay & Michael Minnis & Andrew Sutherland, 2020. "Regulatory Spillovers in Common Audit Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3389-3411, August.
    6. Vladimir Asriyan & Luc Laeven & Alberto Martín, 2022. "Collateral Booms and Information Depletion [Rational Exuberance Booms]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(2), pages 517-555.
    7. Campbell, Dennis & Loumioti, Maria & Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina, 2019. "Making sense of soft information: interpretation bias and loan quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2).
    8. João Granja & Christian Leuz & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2022. "Going the Extra Mile: Distant Lending and Credit Cycles," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(2), pages 1259-1324, April.
    9. Bo Becker & Marieke Bos & Kasper Roszbach, 2020. "Bad Times, Good Credit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(S1), pages 107-142, October.
    10. Nagar, Venky & Schoenfeld, Jordan, 2021. "Shareholder monitoring and discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1).
    11. Wenhua Di & Nathaniel Pattison, 2020. "Distant Lending, Specialization, and Access to Credit," Working Papers 2003, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    12. Liberti, José & Sturgess, Jason & Sutherland, Andrew, 2022. "How voluntary information sharing systems form: Evidence from a U.S. commercial credit bureau," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 827-849.
    13. Balakrishnan, Karthik & De George, Emmanuel T. & Ertan, Aytekin & Scobie, Hannah, 2021. "Economic consequences of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2).
    14. Sutherland, Andrew G., 2020. "Technology is changing lending: Implications for research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2).
    15. Petro Lisowsky & Michael Minnis, 2020. "The Silent Majority: Private U.S. Firms and Financial Reporting Choices," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 547-588, June.
    16. Di, Wenhua & Pattison, Nathaniel, 2023. "Industry Specialization and Small Business Lending," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    17. Dam, Kaniṣka & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2021. "Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: The role of collusive threats," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    18. Badertscher, Brad A. & Kim, Jaewoo & Kinney, William R. & Owens, Edward, 2023. "Assurance level choice, CPA fees, and financial reporting benefits: Inferences from U.S. private firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2).
    19. Adam Esplin & Karim Jamal & Shyam Sunder, 2018. "Demand for and Assessment of Audit Quality in Private Companies," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 54(3), pages 319-352, September.
    20. Berger, Philip G. & Minnis, Michael & Sutherland, Andrew, 2017. "Commercial lending concentration and bank expertise: Evidence from borrower financial statements," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 253-277.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Petro Lisowsky & Michael Minnis, 2020. "The Silent Majority: Private U.S. Firms and Financial Reporting Choices," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 547-588, June.
    2. Berger, Philip G. & Minnis, Michael & Sutherland, Andrew, 2017. "Commercial lending concentration and bank expertise: Evidence from borrower financial statements," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 253-277.
    3. Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2‐3), pages 367-384, March.
    4. Gete, Pedro & Tiernan, Natalie, 2014. "Lending Standards and Countercyclical Capital Requirements under Imperfect Information," MPRA Paper 54486, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Kuncl, Martin, 2019. "Securitization under asymmetric information over the business cycle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 237-256.
    6. Raphael Duguay & Michael Minnis & Andrew Sutherland, 2020. "Regulatory Spillovers in Common Audit Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3389-3411, August.
    7. Sutherland, Andrew, 2018. "Does credit reporting lead to a decline in relationship lending? Evidence from information sharing technology," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 123-141.
    8. Anjan V. Thakor, 2015. "The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Why Did It Happen and What Did We Learn?," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 155-205.
    9. Andre Guettler & Ulrich Hommel & Julia Reichert, 2011. "The influence of sponsor, servicer, and underwriter characteristics on RMBS performance," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 25(3), pages 281-311, September.
    10. Mikel Bedayo & Gabriel Jiménez & José-Luis Peydró & Raquel Vegas, 2020. "Screening and Loan Origination Time: Lending Standards, Loan Defaults and Bank Failures," Working Papers 1215, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Coibion, Olivier & Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Kudlyak, Marianna & Mondragon, John, 2014. "Does Greater Inequality Lead to More Household Borrowing? New Evidence from Household Data," IZA Discussion Papers 7910, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. James Tan & Siew Ann Cheong, 2016. "The Regime Shift Associated with the 2004–2008 US Housing Market Bubble," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(9), pages 1-8, September.
    13. Dursun-de Neef, H. Özlem, 2023. "Bank specialization, mortgage lending and house prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    14. Gabriel Jiménez & Steven Ongena & José‐Luis Peydró & Jesús Saurina, 2014. "Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty‐Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk‐Taking?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 463-505, March.
    15. van der Plaat, Mark, 2020. "Loan sales and the tyranny of tistance in U.S. residential mortgage lending," MPRA Paper 107519, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Apr 2021.
    16. Daniel I. García, 2018. "Employment in the Great Recession : How Important Were Household Credit Supply Shocks?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-074, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    17. Ahnert, Toni & Kuncl, Martin, 2022. "Government loan guarantees, market liquidity, and lending standards," Working Paper Series 2710, European Central Bank.
    18. Ongena, Steven & Kara, Alper & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2011. "Securitization and lending standards: evidence from the wholesale loan market," Working Paper Series 1362, European Central Bank.
    19. Li, Yongjia & Tahsin, Salman, 2021. "Home price appreciation and residential lending standards," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    20. Godlewski, Christophe J., 2014. "Bank loans and borrower value during the global financial crisis: Empirical evidence from France," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 100-130.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:55:y:2017:i:4:p:745-794. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-8456 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.