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Efficient Manipulation in a Repeated Setting

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  • JOEL S. DEMSKI
  • HANS FRIMOR
  • DAVID E. M. SAPPINGTON

Abstract

We analyze the optimal behavior of an organization when its employees can manipulate the organization's accounting system to their private advantage. We find that the organization may benefit by helping its employees manipulate the system. This help can reduce the employees' private returns from devoting effort to further manipulation of the accounting system, which reduces the cost of motivating the employees to devote their effort to improving the real (rather than the measured) performance of the organization. Copyright University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2004.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Accounting Research.

Volume (Year): 42 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 31-49

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Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:42:y:2004:i:1:p:31-49

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Cited by:
  1. Fran├žois Larmande & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2014. "Fishing for Excuses and Performance Evaluation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4569, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Laux, Volker & Stocken, Phillip C., 2012. "Managerial reporting, overoptimism, and litigation risk," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 577-591.
  3. Linus Wilson, 2011. "Hard debt, soft CEOs, and union rents," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 37(8), pages 736-764, August.
  4. Gibbs, Michael & Merchant, Kenneth A. & Van der Stede, Wim A. & Vargus, Mark A., 2004. "Performance Measure Properties and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1356, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Wielhouwer, J.L., 2011. "On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-4260929, Tilburg University.

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