Performance Measure Properties and Incentives
AbstractWe examine the effects of performance measure properties on incentive system design, using data on incentive contracts for auto dealership managers. The data include information on five properties: two indicators of risk; two indicators of distortion; and one indicator of potential manipulation. We find that these properties have important effects on incentive system design. First, firms appear to choose the “best” performance measure available along these dimensions, and use it for the most important (primary) formula bonus. Second, the properties of this primary performance measure are important determinants of the weight placed on the measure for explicit. Third, firms appear to use other performance measures to balance multitask incentives relative to the primary performance measure. Specifically, we find evidence that second and third bonuses are used to provide better incentives for cooperation and to reduce incentives for manipulation. Fourth, we present evidence that subjectivity, through discretionary bonuses based on subjective performance evaluations, and also through implicit incentives for promotions and other rewards, also appear to play the same roles.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1356.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Industrial Relations, 2009, 48(2), 237-264
Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BEC-2004-11-07 (Business Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June.
- Bushman, Robert M. & Indjejikian, Raffi J. & Smith, Abbie, 1996. "CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 161-193, April.
- Joel S. Demski & Hans Frimor & David E. M. Sappington, 2004. "Efficient Manipulation in a Repeated Setting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 31-49, 03.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1997.
"Moral Hazard and Observability,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1205, David K. Levine.
- Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
- Michael Raith, 2003. "Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1425-1436, September.
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
- Gerald Marschke & Pascal Courty, 2004.
"A General Test of Gaming,"
04-04, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
- Cindy Zawadzki, 2006. "Indicateurs, acteurs et slack : la gestion de la viabilité hivernale sur les autoroutes," Post-Print halshs-00558405, HAL.
- Jed Devaro & Fidan Ana Kurtulus, 2011. "An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and The Delegation of Worker Authority," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2011-13, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Antti Kauhanen & Sami Napari, 2012.
"Performance Measurement and Incentive Plans,"
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 645-669, 07.
- Thiele, Veikko, 2007.
"Performance measurement in multi-task agencies,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 148-163, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.