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Vendor Certification and Appraisal: Implications for Supplier Quality


Author Info

  • Iny Hwang

    (College of Business, Minnesota State University, Mankato, Minnesota 56001)

  • Suresh Radhakrishnan

    (School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, SM41, Richardson, Texas 75083)

  • Lixin (Nancy) Su

    (School of Accounting and Finance, Faculty of Business, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong)

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    We examine the buyer's problem of inducing the supplier's quality effort using two arrangements: the appraisal regime and the certification regime. In the appraisal regime, the buyer inspects the units supplied and either charges a penalty for defective units identified during inspection or pays the unit price for good units. In the certification regime, the supplier obtains vendor certification and the buyer pays the unit price for all units supplied. The inspection technology and the certification process provide noisy information on the supplier's quality effort. In the appraisal regime, the buyer implements the supplier's high-quality and low-inspection. The supplier's expected profit is greater than his reservation profit because of an additional agency cost: The buyer has to prevent the supplier from performing unwanted/preemptive inspection (which gives rise to indirect costs from delay, etc.). This additional agency cost arises precisely when the effectiveness of inspection is high. This provides a moral-hazard-based rationale for the increasing use of certification (such as ISO 9000) in spite of (in fact, because of) the increasing effectiveness of inspection. The potential for additional agency cost incurred by the buyer in the appraisal regime highlights an indirect cost associated with inspection.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.

    Volume (Year): 52 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 10 (October)
    Pages: 1472-1482

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    Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:52:y:2006:i:10:p:1472-1482

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    Related research

    Keywords: incentives; supply chain; moral hazard; quality management; inspection; appraisal; vendor certification; game theory; ISO 9000; supplier quality;


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    Cited by:
    1. Dionisia Tzavara & Adrienne Héritier, 2011. "Quality and Environmental Regulation: Verifying Compliance along the Supply Chain," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/16, European University Institute.
    2. Dionisia Tzavara and Adrienne Héritier, 2011. "Quality and Environmental Regulation: Verifying Compliance along the Supply Chain," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 16, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    3. Xie, Gang & Yue, Wuyi & Wang, Shouyang & Lai, Kin Keung, 2011. "Quality investment and price decision in a risk-averse supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 214(2), pages 403-410, October.
    4. Pun, Hubert & Sebastian Heese, H., 2014. "Outsourcing to suppliers with unknown capabilities," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(1), pages 108-118.
    5. Aust, Gerhard & Bräuer, Ina & Buscher, Udo, 2014. "A note on “Quality investment and inspection policy in a supplier-manufacturer supply chain”," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 910-915.
    6. Yim, Andrew, 2010. "Quality Cost and Failure Risk in the Choice of Single versus Multiple Sourcing," MPRA Paper 27858, University Library of Munich, Germany.


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