Multinationals, Tax Holidays, And Technology Transfer
Abstract
Host country governments often grant investment incentives to foreign firms locating in their territories. We show that such preferential treatment of foreign firms can facilitate transfer of foreign technology, induce entry by the local firm, and increase host country welfare. However, this pro-competitive result occurs when preferential treatment is granted for a limited time; i.e., it takes the form of tax holidays, and is absent under permanent tax concessions.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Article provided by Japanese Economic Association in its journal Japanese Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 60 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 82-96
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Kaz Miyagiwa & Yuka Ohno, 2008. "Multinationals, Tax Holidays, and Technology Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 0717, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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