Some Inefficiency Implications Of Generational Politics And Exchange
AbstractThis paper explores the implications of generational selfishness in a model in which each generation has its own government. Such selfish generational governments will potentially distort the economy along a number of dimensions. One is the monopolization of factor supplies; another is the under- or overprovision of durable public goods. We demonstrate that selfish generations may place sizable marginal taxes on their factor supplies in order to monopolize their factor markets. We also show that selfish generations will provide inefficient levels of durable public goods both at the local and national levels. Finally, we demonstrate that generational inefficiencies can arise even in models of cooperative bargaining because of the first-mover advantage of earlier generations. Copyright 1993 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics & Politics.
Volume (Year): 5 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985
Other versions of this item:
- Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1994. "Some Inefficiency Implication of Generational Politics and Exchange," NBER Working Papers 3354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sadka, Efraim, 1976. "On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 261-67, June.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"A Theory of Social Interactions,"
NBER Working Papers
0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 467.
- Summers, Lawrence H, 1981. "Capital Taxation and Accumulation in a Life Cycle Growth Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 533-44, September.
- Barro, Robert J., 1974.
"Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?,"
3451399, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five Years After Tiebout: A Perspective," NBER Working Papers 0954, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-77, September.
- Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen & Esko Niskanen, 2001.
"Bequests, Control Rights, and Cost-Benefit Analysis,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
576, CESifo Group Munich.
- Glazer, Amihai & Kanniainen, Vesa & Niskanen, Esko, 2003. "Bequests, control rights, and cost-benefit analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 71-82, March.
- Gonzales-Eiras, Martín & Niepelt, Dirk, 2004.
"Sustaining Social Security,"
731, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Martin Gonzalez-Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2004. "Sustaining Social Security," 2004 Meeting Papers 199, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Dirk Niepelt & Martin Gonzalez-Eiras, 2007. "Sustaining Social Security," 2007 Meeting Papers 95, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Martin Gonzalez Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2004. "Sustaining Social Security," Working Papers 72, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jun 2004.
- Martín Gonzalez-Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2005. "Sustaining Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series 1494, CESifo Group Munich.
- Antonio Rangel, 2000.
"Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange,"
NBER Working Papers
7518, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Antonio Rangel, 1999. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange," Working Papers 00001, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- M. Magnani, 2005. "Labour market regulation and retirement age," Economics Department Working Papers 2005-EP02, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
- Antonio Rangel, 2002. "How to Protect Future Generations Using Tax Base Restrictions," NBER Working Papers 9179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Antonio Rangel, 2005. "How to Protect Future Generations Using Tax-Base Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 314-346, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.