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Finite Horizons, Political Economy, and Growth

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Author Info
James A Kahn (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
Jong-Soo Lim (Kwangwoon University)

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the political economy of growth when agents and the government have finite horizons and equilibrium growth is inefficient. A "representative" government (i.e. one whose preferences reflect those of its constituents) endowed merely with the ability to tax and transfer can improve somewhat on the market allocation, but cannot achieve first-best growth. Efficiency requires in addition the ability to bind future governments. We argue that this ability is related to political stability, and provide empirical evidence that stability and growth-related policies (namely education) are meaningfully related. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/redy.2000.0111
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 4 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-25
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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:4:y:2001:i:1:p:1-25

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Related research
Keywords: growth; political instability; political economy; education; Markov equilibrium;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D9 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth
H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
O5 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. James A. Kahn, 1997. "Education, political instability, and growth," Research Paper 9737, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 467. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. David I. Laibson, 1996. "Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy," NBER Working Papers 5635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alesina, Alberto, et al, 1996. " Political Instability and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 189-211, June.
    Other versions:
  5. Persson, Mats & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1987. "Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1419-31, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Alex Cukierman & Sebastian Edwards & Guido Tabellini, 1989. "Seigniorage and Political Instability," NBER Working Papers 3199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1989. "A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 713-32, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Fernandez, Raquel & Rogerson, Richard, 1995. "On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(2), pages 249-62, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Azariadis, Costas & Drazen, Allan, 1990. "Threshold Externalities in Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 501-26, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B, 1992. "Public versus Private Investment in Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 813-34, August.
  12. Cass, David, 1972. "On capital overaccumulation in the aggregative, neoclassical model of economic growth: A complete characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 200-223, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Ljungqvist, Lars, 1995. "Wage structure as implicit insurance on human capital in developed versus underdeveloped countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 35-50, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-77, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Saint-Paul, Gilles & Verdier, Thierry, 1993. "Education, democracy and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 399-407, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong-Wha, 1994. "Sources of economic growth," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-46, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. James A. Kahn, 1997. "Education, political instability, and growth," Research Paper 9737, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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