IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecopol/v35y2023i1p286-312.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Embedded autonomy, political institutions, and access orders

Author

Listed:
  • Weicheng Lyu
  • Nirvikar Singh

Abstract

We construct a model of “embedded autonomy,” the idea that the closeness of bureaucrats and business people may lead to growth‐promoting policies by the government, though at the risk of leading to crony capitalism. We analyze how the level of monitoring to control corruption and the weight given to the future affect the nature of the possible outcomes. We explore possible tradeoffs between growth and inclusiveness and discuss how our model relates to more general concepts of inclusiveness of institutions, as framed by Acemoglu and Robinson, or the nature of “access orders,” as introduced by North, Wallis, and Weingast.

Suggested Citation

  • Weicheng Lyu & Nirvikar Singh, 2023. "Embedded autonomy, political institutions, and access orders," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 286-312, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:35:y:2023:i:1:p:286-312
    DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12215
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12215
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ecpo.12215?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Joulfaian, 2009. "Bribes and Business Tax Evasion," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 6(2), pages 227-244, December.
    2. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-1244, September.
    3. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2008. "Alfred Marshall Lecture Social Capital as Good Culture," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 295-320, 04-05.
    4. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2010. "State Capacity, Conflict, and Development," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 1-34, January.
    5. van Besouw, Bram & Ansink, Erik & van Bavel, Bas, 2016. "The economics of violence in natural states," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 139-156.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2011. "Emergence And Persistence Of Inefficient States," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 177-208, April.
    7. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2007. "Social Capital as Good Culture," NBER Working Papers 13712, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2013. "Taxation and Development," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 041, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    9. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 178-218, January.
    10. Laura Routley, 2012. "Developmental states: a review of the literature," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-003-12, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    11. Van Bavel, Bas & Ansink, Erik & Van Besouw, Bram, 2017. "Understanding the economics of limited access orders: incentives, organizations and the chronology of developments," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 109-131, March.
    12. Dzhumashev, Ratbek, 2014. "Corruption and growth: The role of governance, public spending, and economic development," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 202-215.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    2. Singh, Nirvikar, 2019. "Theories of Governance and Development: How Does India’s Experience Fit?," MPRA Paper 91049, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Pedro Naso & Erwin Bulte & Tim Swanson, 2017. "Can there be benefits from competing legal regimes? The impact of legal pluralism in post-conflict Sierra Leone," CIES Research Paper series 56-2017, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
    4. Anna & Leonardo Weller, 2018. "Was Cold War A Constraint To Income Inequality?," Anais do XLIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 44th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 94, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    5. Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2021. "Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 583-610, November.
    6. Alou Adessé Dama, 2021. "Exploring Tilly’s Theory : Violent Conflicts and Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa," CERDI Working papers hal-03401539, HAL.
    7. Helios Herrera & César Martinelli, 2013. "Oligarchy, democracy, and state capacity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 165-186, January.
    8. Mark Dincecco & Mauricio Prado, 2012. "Warfare, fiscal capacity, and performance," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 171-203, September.
    9. Francesco Angelini & Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani, 2020. "Governance efficiency with and without government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 183-200, January.
    10. Guo, Jang-Ting & Hung, Fu-Sheng, 2020. "Tax evasion and financial development under asymmetric information in credit markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    11. Timothy Besley & Ethan Ilzetzki & Torsten Persson, 2013. "Weak States and Steady States: The Dynamics of Fiscal Capacity," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 205-235, October.
    12. Khan, Adnan & Nasim, Sanval & Shaukat, Mahvish & Stegmann, Andreas, 2021. "Building trust in the state with information: Evidence from urban Punjab," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    13. Grier, Robin & Young, Andrew T. & Grier, Kevin, 2022. "The causal effects of rule of law & property rights on fiscal capacity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    14. Roberti, Paolo, 2019. "State capacity and repression: A model of colonial rule," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 247-264.
    15. Broadberry, Stephen & Harrison, Mark (ed.), 2020. "The Economics of the Second World War: Seventy-Five Years On," Vox eBooks, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number p326.
    16. Jon C. Thompson & Jiabin Wu, 2018. "Legal institution and the evolution of moral conduct," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 725-741, October.
    17. Oasis Kodila-Tedika & Asongu Simplice, 2016. "State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 43(10), pages 1016-1030, October.
    18. Knutsen, Carl Henrik, 2013. "Democracy, State Capacity, and Economic Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-18.
    19. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.
    20. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2020. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 116-140.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:35:y:2023:i:1:p:286-312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.