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The Moral Costs Of Nastiness

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  • KLAUS ABBINK
  • BENEDIKT HERRMANN

Abstract

We introduce two variants of the one-shot joy-of-destruction minigame (mini-JOD). Two players are endowed with the same amount of money. They simultaneously decide whether or not to reduce the payoff of the other player at an own cost. In one treatment there was a probability that Nature would destroy the opponent’s money anyway. We test whether this feature reduces the moral costs of being nasty, and find that destruction rates rise significantly, despite the absence of strategic reasons.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 49 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 631-633

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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:49:y:2011:i:2:p:631-633

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References

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  1. Tatsuyoshi, S. & Nakamura, H., 1995. "The 'Spite' Dilema in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments," ISER Discussion Paper 0370, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  2. Georg Kirchsteiger, 1994. "The role of envy in ultimatum games," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5925, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. Daniel J. ZIZZO & Andrew J. OSWALD, 2001. "Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others'Incomes?," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 63-64, pages 39-65.
  4. repec:fth:osakae:370 is not listed on IDEAS
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. People are nasty
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-09-03 14:42:00
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Cited by:
  1. Alexander Isakov & David Rand, 2012. "The Evolution of Coercive Institutional Punishment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 97-109, March.
  2. Levy, Moshe, 2012. "Co-monotonicity: Toward a utility function capturing envy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 16-19.
  3. Le Zhang & Andreas Ortmann, 2013. "On the Interpretation of Giving, Taking, and Destruction in Dictator Games and Joy-of-Destruction Games," Discussion Papers 2012-50A, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  4. Guha, Brishti, 2014. "Reinterpreting King Solomon's problem: Malice and mechanism design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 125-132.
  5. Le Zhang & Andreas Ortmann, 2012. "On the Interpretation of Giving, Taking, and Destruction in Dictator Games and Joy-of-Destruction Games," Discussion Papers 2012-50, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  6. Sebastian Prediger & Björn Vollan & Benedikt Herrmann, 2013. "Resource Scarcity, Spite and Cooperation," GIGA Working Paper Series 227, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
  7. David Schüller & Thorsten Upmann, 2013. "When Focal Points are Out of Focus: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Come Dine with Me," CESifo Working Paper Series 4138, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Bruce Lyons & Gordon Menzies & Daniel Zizzo, 2012. "Conflicting evidence and decisions by agency professionals: an experimental test in the context of merger regulation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 465-499, September.
  9. Sandro Casal & Werner Güth & Mofei Jia & Matteo Ploner, 2011. "Would You Mind if I Get More? An Experimental Study of the Envy Game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-051, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  10. Philip J. Grossman & Mana Komai, 2012. "The Economic Impact of Anti-Social Preferences in a Multi-Period Game with Attacks and Insurance," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series 21-12, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  11. Charness, Gary & Masclet, David & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2012. "The Dark Side of Competition for Status," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt1vr4g446, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  12. Klaus Abbink & David Masclet & Daniel Mirza, 2012. "Inequality and Inter-group Conflicts – Experimental Evidence," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-07-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
  13. Tore Ellingsen & Benedikt Herrmann & Martin A. Nowak & David G. Rand & Corina E. Tarnita, 2012. "Civic Capital in Two Cultures: The Nature of Cooperation in Romania and USA," CESifo Working Paper Series 4042, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Simon Halliday, 2011. "Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games," Working Papers 211, Economic Research Southern Africa.
  15. Dato, Simon & Nieken, Petra, 2013. "Gender Differences in Competition and Sabotage," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79750, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  16. Kirsten Häger & Bastiaan Oud & Daniel Schunk, 2012. "Egalitarian Envy: Cross-cultural Variation in the Development of Envy in Children," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-059, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  17. Abbink, Klaus & de Haan, Thomas, 2014. "Trust on the brink of Armageddon: The first-strike game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 190-196.
  18. Koch, Christian, 2013. "The Virtue Ethics Hypothesis: Is there a nexus between virtues and well-being?," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80054, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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