This article describes thinking on the institutions of financial supervision and regulation prior to the current crisis and goes on to examine what lessons have been learnt subsequently. It concludes that the problem is not so much that central banks needed to be more closely involved in supervision at the outset but that many countries did not have satisfactory schemes in place for resolving problems in large institutions. Central banks and governments were then forced into "ad hoc" measures that could have unfortunate implications for moral hazard in the future unless fundamental problems are addressed. Copyright (c) 2009 The Author. Journal compilation (c) Institute of Economic Affairs 2009. Published by Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Economic Affairs.