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An Explanation of Top Executive Pay: A UK Study

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  • Phillip J. McKnight

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  • Phillip J. McKnight, 1996. "An Explanation of Top Executive Pay: A UK Study," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 34(4), pages 557-566, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:34:y:1996:i:4:p:557-566
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1996.tb00490.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Conyon, Martin J & Leech, Dennis, 1994. "Top Pay, Company Performance and Corporate Governance," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 56(3), pages 229-247, August.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Conyon, Martin & Gregg, Paul & Machin, Stephen, 1995. "Taking Care of Business, Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 704-714, May.
    4. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    5. Martin J Conyon & Paul Gregg, 1994. "Pay at the Top: A Study of the Sensitivity of Top Director Remuneration to Company Specific Shocks," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 149(1), pages 83-92, August.
    6. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
    7. repec:sae:niesru:v:149:y::i:1:p:83-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, 1989. "Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 121-134, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Hristos Doucouliagos & Janto Haman & T.D. Stanley, 2012. "Pay for Performance and Corporate Governance Reform," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 670-703, July.
    2. Yaron Amzaleg & Abraham Mehrez, 2004. "The ‘One Million Club:’ Executive Compensation And Firm Performance," Israel Economic Review, Bank of Israel, vol. 2(1), pages 107-147.
    3. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
    4. Schmid, Stefan & Altfeld, Frederic, 2018. "International work experience and compensation: Is more always better for CFOs?," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 530-543.
    5. Chenli Yin & Dan Li & Maria Paz Salmador, 2022. "Institutional change of compensation policy and its impact on CEO turnover and firm performance," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(8), pages 2527-2552, November.

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