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Homo Economicus Meets G. H. Mead: A Contribution to the Critique of Economic Theory

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  • David Wilson
  • William Dixon

Abstract

. The relation between economic behavior and morality remains a live issue within economics and cognate disciplines. The standard view among economists themselves has been that while moral positions (understood broadly) may motivate our behavior, they do not capacitate or enable it. On this view the figure of Homo economicus, representing the how as against the why of our actions, must be understood as resolutely amoral. In this article, we attempt to recover the logic of this position, as well as those of critics who would modify the standard view in some way. Although also critical of the conventional economics‐and‐ethics divide, we argue that Homo economicus would benefit from a more fundamental rethinking, one that takes account of the theory of the self and its acts, as developed by the social psychologist G. H. Mead. On a Meadian view the economic actor would neither have to grow additional capacities in order to coordinate with his or her fellows, as the evolutionary games theorist's agent has to do, nor depart or deviate from purposeful behavior, as does Homo sociologicus. On a Meadian view, economic capacity has to be more richly endowed than standard Homo economicus in order to do what it is supposed to do, but it is recognizably still a single, purposeful capacity.

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  • David Wilson & William Dixon, 2008. "Homo Economicus Meets G. H. Mead: A Contribution to the Critique of Economic Theory," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 241-263, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:67:y:2008:i:2:p:241-263
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2008.00569.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert Sugden, 2005. "Spontaneous Order," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, chapter 1, pages 1-9, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
    3. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, December.
    4. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
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    1. David Wilson & William Dixon, 2009. "Performing Economics: A Critique of 'Teaching and Learning'," International Review of Economic Education, Economics Network, University of Bristol, vol. 8(2), pages 91-105.

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