Democracy, Rationality and Morality
AbstractThe fundamental, underlying assumption in economics, public choice, and increasingly in political science and other branches of the social sciences is that individuals are rational actors. Many people have questioned the realism of this assumption, however, and considerable experimental evidence seems to refute it. This paper builds on recent findings from the field of evolutionary psychology to discuss the evolution of rational behavior in humans. It then goes on to relate this evolutionary process to the evolution of political institutions and in particular of democratic institutions. Length 58 pages
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2006-15.
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2006-12-16 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CBE-2006-12-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2006-12-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2006-12-16 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-12-16 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-12-16 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karin Serfling).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.