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The foundation of contemporary economics: James Buchanan and constitutional economics

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  • Henrik Egbert
  • Teodor Sedlarski

Abstract

We provide a short introduction into the concept of Constitutional Economics. This approach is a subfield within Public Choice Theory. Public Choice and Constitutional Economics are closely related to the name of James Buchanan who, together with his colleagues, initiated Public Choice Theory in the 1950’s and Constitutional Economics in the 1980’s. The latter emphasizes the choice of these rules, e.g. the constitutional framework of a society that structures social order. The choice of rules is modeled as acts of exchange in the political process.

Suggested Citation

  • Henrik Egbert & Teodor Sedlarski, 2018. "The foundation of contemporary economics: James Buchanan and constitutional economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 113-122.
    • Handle: RePEc:bas:econth:y:2018:i:1:p:113-122
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    2. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 243-250, June.
    3. James M. Buchanan, 1949. "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57, pages 496-496.
    4. James Buchanan, 1993. "How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 1-6, December.
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