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The Influence of Knut Wicksell on Richard Musgrave and James Buchanan

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  • Bernd Hansjürgens

Abstract

The schools of thought that Richard Musgrave and James Buchanan represent in the field of public finance differ a great deal. Musgrave represents the insider-Harvard vision of socio-political reality while Buchanan represents the outsider-Chicago-Virginia-public choice vision. The foundation of different schools of thought by Musgrave and Buchanan is surprising insofar as both Musgraveand Buchanan call Knut Wicksell their intellectual father and claim their own work to stand in the Wicksellian tradition. In this paper, the influence of Wicksell on the works of Musgrave and Buchanan is traced out. The paper comes to the conclusion that it is Buchanan on whose work Wicksell had the strongerinfluence. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Bernd Hansjürgens, 2000. "The Influence of Knut Wicksell on Richard Musgrave and James Buchanan," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 95-116, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:103:y:2000:i:1:p:95-116
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1005033202420
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Musgrave, 1996. "The role of the state in fiscal theory," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 247-258, July.
    2. Wagner, Richard E, 1997. "Choice, Exchange, and Public Finance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 160-163, May.
    3. Buchanan, James M., 1976. "Taxation in fiscal exchange," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 17-29.
    4. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922.
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    6. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 243-250, June.
    7. Knut Wicksell, 1958. "A New Principle of Just Taxation," International Economic Association Series, in: Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock (ed.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, pages 72-118, Palgrave Macmillan.
    8. Roger D. Congleton, 1988. "An Overview of the Contractarian Public Finance of James Buchanan," Public Finance Review, , vol. 16(2), pages 131-157, April.
    9. P. Hennipman, 1982. "Wicksell and Pareto: Their Relationship in the Theory of Public Finance," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 37-64, Spring.
    10. Ingo Pies, 1996. "Public choice versus constitutional economics: A methodological interpretation of the Buchanan research program," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 21-34, March.
    11. James M. Buchanan, 1949. "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57, pages 496-496.
    12. Musgrave, Richard A, 1997. "Reconsidering the Fiscal Role of Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 156-159, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marianne Johnson, 2005. "Wicksell's Unaminity Rule," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(4), pages 1049-1071, October.

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