Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 20 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
Buchanan; Robbins; Constitutional political economy; Public choice; Choice; Exchange; B29; B31; B41;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B29 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Other
- B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Buchanan, James M, 1988. "Contractarian Political Economy and Constitutional Interpretation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 135-39, May.
- Buchanan, James M., 1986.
"The Constitution of Economic Policy,"
Nobel Prize in Economics documents
1986-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Gordon, Scott, 1976. "The New Contractarians," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 573-90, June.
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2008. "The Reason of Rules," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521070904, December.
- Buchanan, James M, 1975. "A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 225-30, May.
- Robbins, Lionel [Lord], 1981. "Economics and Political Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 1-10, May.
- James M. Buchanan, 1949. "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57, pages 496.
- Régis Servant, 2010. "La recherche de bonnes règles sociales: objet de science et de choix démocratique ? Le cas de Friedrich Hayek," Post-Print hal-00641440, HAL.
- Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto, 2010. "Out of a slave contract: the analysis of pre-Hobbesian anarchists in the Old Testament," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 288-307, September.
- Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay, 2014. "On the Definition of Public Goods. Assessing Richard A. Musgrave's contribution," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14004, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Libman, A., 2013. "Between New Political Economy and Political Science: Convergence and Divergence of Disciplines," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 166-169.
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