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Polarización política, rigideces presupuestarias e inflación

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  • Santiago Pérez Vincent

    (Universidad Bocconi)

Abstract

Los distintos países muestran historias inflacionarias muy diversas. La literatura económica señala a las características del sistema político como uno de los factores que explican estas diferencias. En particular, la inestabilidad y la polarización política son destacadas como factores que inciden en un mayor nivel y una mayor volatilidad de la inflación. Este trabajo presenta una explicación novedosa para este vínculo. El trabajo muestra que las rigideces presupuestarias (en particular, la inflexibilidad a la baja del gasto público nominal) pueden llevar a que un mayor grado de polarización política aumente el nivel y la volatilidad de la tasa inflación.

Suggested Citation

  • Santiago Pérez Vincent, 2013. "Polarización política, rigideces presupuestarias e inflación," Ensayos de Política Económica, Departamento de Investigación Francisco Valsecchi, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina., vol. 2(1), pages 99-144, Octubre.
    • Handle: RePEc:atw:epecon:v:2:y:2013:i:1:p:99-144
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    inflación; economía política; presupuesto; gastos públicos;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt

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