Product and Occupational Liability
AbstractIncreased liability for risks posed by jobs and products has transformed the cost structure of job and product markets. Liability costs used to be an incidental expense; now they are a factor of substantial economic consequence. The costs associated with a more active economic role of liability are not necessarily undesirable. However, examination of the economic objectives of the liability system will indicate that the current structure is not ideal. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the emerging role of liability is that it has been contemporaneous with an expansion in governmental risk regulation. The subsequent sections explore the performance of product and occupational liability with respect to the objectives of efficient deterrence and insurance, in the context of seeking an optimal mix between legal and regulatory institutions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): 5 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
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- Beatty, Anne & Gron, Anne & Jorgensen, Bjorn, 2005. "Corporate risk management: evidence from product liability," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 152-178, April.
- Ram Singh, 2002. "Characterization of Efficient Product Liability Rules: When Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers 110, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2009.
"An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
14752, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Cavaliere, 2004. "Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 299-318, December.
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