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Constrained Efficiency in a Human Capital Model

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  • Yena Park

Abstract

This paper investigates whether capital and human capital are over-accumulated in an incomplete market economy. As in Davila et al. (2012), whether capital is over-accumulated depends on how the pecuniary externalities affect insurance and redistribution. In a human capital economy, however, not only capital but also human capital generates externalities and an additional channel arises that has implications for the overaccumulation (under-accumulation) of capital (human capital). The income sources of the poor and the correlation between wealth and human capital are crucial for the implication of pecuniary externalities. Realistically calibrated models exhibit under-accumulation (overaccumulation) of capital (human capital).

Suggested Citation

  • Yena Park, 2018. "Constrained Efficiency in a Human Capital Model," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 179-214, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:10:y:2018:i:3:p:179-214
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.20160405
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Huggett & Gustavo Ventura & Amir Yaron, 2011. "Sources of Lifetime Inequality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 2923-2954, December.
    2. Kehoe, Patrick J. & Perri, Fabrizio, 2004. "Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 184-206, November.
    3. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(4), pages 865-888.
    4. Yena Park, 2014. "Optimal Taxation in a Limited Commitment Economy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(2), pages 884-918.
    5. , & ,, 2006. "Endogenous incomplete markets, enforcement constraints, and intermediation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 439-459, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Lanteri & Adriano A. Rampini, 2023. "Constrained-Efficient Capital Reallocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(2), pages 354-395, February.
    2. Bar Light, 2019. "General equilibrium in a heterogeneous-agent incomplete-market economy with many consumption goods and a risk-free bond," Papers 1906.06810, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    3. Karol Mazur, 2022. "Risky human capital accumulation with endogenous skill premium," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 283-291, October.
    4. Krueger, Dirk & Ludwig, Alexander & Villalvazo, Sergio, 2021. "Optimal taxes on capital in the OLG model with uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • I26 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Returns to Education
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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