Sharing Risk Efficiently under Suboptimal Punishments for Defection
AbstractI study efficient risk-sharing in an endowments economy when enforcement is achieved by the threat of reversion to punishments that may be less severe than autarkic consumption. I characterize (up to a technical condition) the set of allocations that may be interpreted as efficient with respect to some punishment convention. The conditions rationalizing such efficiency are very weak; they are (i) resource exhaustion, (ii) satisfaction of individual rationality constraints at each continuation, and (iii) finiteness of the value of the allocation under the implicit decentralizing price system. I show how efficient allocations may be decentralized, and I state versions of the Welfare Theorems for these economies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
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