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An alternative characterization of top trading cycles

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Cited by:

  1. Dur, Umut & Morrill, Thayer, 2018. "Competitive equilibria in school assignment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 269-274.
  2. Morrill, Thayer & Roth, Alvin E., 2024. "Top trading cycles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
  3. Ayoade, Nickesha & Pápai, Szilvia, 2023. "School choice with preference rank classes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 317-341.
  4. Can, Burak & Pourpouneh, Mohsen & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "Cost of transformation: a measure on matchings," Research Memorandum 015, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  5. Umut Mert Dur & M. Utku Unver, 2015. "Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange: Tuition and Worker Exchanges," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1508, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  6. Patrick Harless & William Phan, 2020. "On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley–Scarf model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(2), pages 411-435, September.
  7. Dur, Umut & Paiement, Scott, 2024. "A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 93-100.
  8. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.
  9. Umut Dur & Yifan Xie, 2023. "Responsiveness to priority‐based affirmative action policy in school choice," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(2), pages 229-244, April.
  10. Christian Basteck, 2025. "An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 502, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  11. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Sumit Goel & Yuki Tamura, 2025. "TTC Domains," Papers 2501.15422, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
  13. Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2020. "Pareto Efficiency in Weighted School Choice Problems," Working Papers Dissertations 64, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
  14. Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 16-24.
  15. Siwei Chen & Yajing Chen & Chia‐Ling Hsu, 2023. "New axioms for top trading cycles," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 1064-1077, October.
  16. Duddy, Conal, 2017. "The structure of priority in the school choice problem," MPRA Paper 81057, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao, 2024. "Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
  18. Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2016. "Arrovian Efficiency in Allocation of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 916, Boston College Department of Economics.
  19. Altuntaş, Açelya & Phan, William, 2022. "Trading probabilities along cycles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
  20. Morrill, Thayer, 2015. "Making just school assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 18-27.
  21. Stroh-Maraun, Nadja, 2024. "Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 49-56.
  22. Martin Bichler & Alexander Hammerl & Thayer Morrill & Stefan Waldherr, 2021. "How to Assign Scarce Resources Without Money: Designing Information Systems that are Efficient, Truthful, and (Pretty) Fair," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 335-355, June.
  23. Dilek Sayedahmed, 2022. "Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchical priority classes," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 71-111, December.
  24. Dur, Umut Mert, 2019. "The modified Boston mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 31-40.
  25. Carroll, Gabriel, 2014. "A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 163-177.
  26. Ekici, Özgün, 2024. "Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
  27. Basteck, Christian, 2024. "An axiomatization of the random priority rule," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2024-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  28. Jingsheng Yu & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Efficient and fair trading mechanisms for resource exchange in market design," Papers 2005.06878, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
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