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Effective Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System with a Self-Reporting Requirement

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Carolos Chavez & John Stanlund, 2003. "Enforcing Transferable Permit Systems in the Presence of Market Power," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 25(1), pages 65-78, May.
  2. Akira Maeda, 2012. "Setting trigger price in emissions permit markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 358-379, June.
  3. Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2007. "A laboratory investigation of compliance behavior under tradable emissions rights: Implications for targeted enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 196-212, March.
  4. Larry Karp & Jinhua Zhao, 2010. "International Environmental Agreements: Emissions Trade, Safety Valves and Escape Clauses," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 61(1), pages 153-182.
  5. Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2006. "Direct and market effects of enforcing emissions trading programs: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 217-233, October.
  6. Carmen Arguedas, 2008. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 155-168, October.
  7. Ian MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, 2012. "Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 180-203, October.
  8. John Stranlund, 2007. "The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(1), pages 99-117, September.
  9. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2004. "Markets for environmental protection: design and performance incomplete enforcement," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 31(1 Year 20), pages 79-99, June.
  10. Coria, Jessica & Villegas-Palacio, Clara, 2010. "Targeted Enforcement and Aggregate Emissions With Uniform Emission Taxes," Working Papers in Economics 455, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  11. Villegas, Clara & Coria, Jessica, 2009. "Taxes, Permits, and the Adoptation of Abatement Technology under Imperfect Compliance," RFF Working Paper Series dp-09-20-efd, Resources for the Future.
  12. Sabine Aresin, 2015. "Monitoring Abatement in the Presence of an Import Quota on CERs," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2015-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  13. Meredith Fowlie & Jeffrey M. Perloff, 2013. "Distributing Pollution Rights in Cap-and-Trade Programs: Are Outcomes Independent of Allocation?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(5), pages 1640-1652, December.
  14. Heyes, Anthony & Kapur, Sandeep, 2009. "Enforcement missions: Targets vs budgets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 129-140, September.
  15. Enrique Calfucura & Jessica Coria & José Miguel Sánchez, 2008. "Permisos Transables de Emisión en Chile: Lecciones, Desafíos y Oportunidades para Países en Desarrollo," Documentos de Trabajo 347, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  16. Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2003. "An Experimental Analysis Of Compliance Behavior In Emissions Trading Programs: Some Preliminary Results," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22039, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  17. Stranlund, John K. & Chávez, Carlos A. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2009. "The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 183-191, September.
  18. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  19. Alessio D’Amato & Edilio Valentini, 2011. "Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 141-159, October.
  20. Daniel Leppert, 2023. "“No fences make bad neighbors” but markets make better ones: cap-and-trade reduces cross-border SO2 in a natural experiment," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 25(3), pages 407-433, July.
  21. Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J. & Spraggon, John M., 2011. "An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 414-429.
  22. Chongwoo Choe & Charles E. Hyde, 2007. "Multinational Transfer Pricing, Tax Arbitrage and the Arm's Length Principle," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 83(263), pages 398-404, December.
  23. Stranlund, John K., 2006. "Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control," Working Paper Series 14522, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
  24. Carlos Chavez & Hugo Salgado, 2005. "Individual Transferable Quota Markets under Illegal Fishing," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(3), pages 303-324, July.
  25. Coria, Jessica & Villegas-Palacio, Clara & Cárdenas, Juan Camilo, 2011. "Should we tax or let firms trade emissons? An experimental analysis with policy implications for developing countries," Working Papers in Economics 516, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  26. repec:cdl:agrebk:qt1rs9r7z9 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. repec:cdl:agrebk:qt70f62476 is not listed on IDEAS
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