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Citations for "Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?"

by Sonmez, Tayfun

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  1. Mehmet Ekmekci & M. Bumin Yenmez, . "Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E20, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  2. Ayşe Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2009. "Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 383-403, September.
  3. Frank Hüber & Dorothea Kübler, 2011. "Hochschulzulassungen in Deutschland: Wem hilft die Reform durch das „Dialogorientierte Serviceverfahren“?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(4), pages 430-444, November.
  4. Haruvy, Ernan & Roth, Alvin E. & Unver, M. Utku, 2006. "The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 457-486, March.
  5. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation," NBER Working Papers 15006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2007. "College Admissions under Early Decision," MPRA Paper 1906, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Peter Biro & Flip Klijn, 2011. "Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1139, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  8. M. Utku �nver, 1999. "Backward Unraveling over Time: The Evolution of Strategic Behavior in the Entry-Level British Medical Labor Markets," Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 1132, Society for Computational Economics.
  9. Roth, Alvin, 2008. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Scholarly Articles 2579651, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match," NBER Working Papers 14864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Guillaume Frechette & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post- Season College Football Bowls," Microeconomics 0404001, EconWPA, revised 24 Sep 2004.
  12. Assaf Romm, 2014. "Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 851-875, December.
  13. Mustafa Afacan, 2014. "Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 493-514, August.
  14. Kojima, Fuhito, 2012. "School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 685-693.
  15. Onur Kesten, 2012. "On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 677-693, November.
  16. William Thomson, 2014. "New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 255-277, February.
  17. Mustafa Oguz Afacan, 2010. "Group Robust Stability in Matching Markets," Discussion Papers 09-019, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  18. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
  19. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Application fee manipulations in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 446-453.
  20. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Pathak, Parag Abishek & Roth, Alvin E., 2009. "Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," Scholarly Articles 11077572, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  21. Mustafa Afacan, 2013. "The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 139-151, May.
  22. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-27, June.
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