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Citations for "Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?"

by Sonmez, Tayfun

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  1. Haruvy, Ernan & Roth, Alvin E. & Unver, M. Utku, 2006. "The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 457-486, March.
  2. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
  3. Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007. "Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: evidence from post-season college football bowls," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 967-982, December.
  4. Unver, M. Utku, 2001. "Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(6-7), pages 1039-1080, June.
  5. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
  6. Ayşe Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2009. "Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 383-403, September.
  7. Mustafa Afacan, 2014. "Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 493-514, August.
  8. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
  9. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
  10. Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2007. "College Admissions under Early Decision," MPRA Paper 1906, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. William Thomson, 2014. "New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 255-277, February.
  12. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2013. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(2), pages 1-40, June.
  13. Peter Biro & Flip Klijn, 2011. "Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1139, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  14. Onur Kesten, 2012. "On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 677-693, November.
  15. Assaf Romm, 2014. "Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 851-875, December.
  16. Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa, 2012. "Group robust stability in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 394-398.
  17. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Application fee manipulations in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 446-453.
  18. Frank Hüber & Dorothea Kübler, 2011. "Hochschulzulassungen in Deutschland: Wem hilft die Reform durch das „Dialogorientierte Serviceverfahren“?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(4), pages 430-444, November.
  19. Mehmet Ekmekci & M. Bumin Yenmez, "undated". "Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E20, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  20. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2016. "Enrollment manipulations in school choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 119-125.
  21. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match," NBER Working Papers 14864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Kojima, Fuhito, 2012. "School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 685-693.
  23. Mustafa Afacan, 2013. "The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 139-151, May.
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