Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring

Citations

Cited by:

1. Iván Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2022. "Monitoring with career concerns," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 404-428, June.
2. Borys Grochulski & Russell Wong, 2018. "Contingent Debt and Performance Pricing in an Optimal Capital Structure Model with Financial Distress and Reorganization," Working Paper 18-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
3. Pegoraro, Stefano, 2024. "Risk aversion with nothing to lose," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
4. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
5. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023. "The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
   • Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021. "The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
6. Xun Liu & Sen Lin & Lixing Liu & Fei Qian & Kun Zhang, 2020. "Exploring the Factors Triggering Occupational Ethics Risk of Technology Transaction in Chinese Construction Industry," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(4), pages 1-18, February.
7. Cheng Wang, 2005. "Dynamic costly state verification," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(4), pages 887-916, June.
   • Cheng Wang, "undated". "Dynamic Costly State Verification," GSIA Working Papers 2000-26, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
   • Wang, Cheng, 2005. "Dynamic Costly State Verification," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10832, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
8. Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Westerfield, Mark M., 2021. "Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 560-581.
9. Shibata, Takashi & Nishihara, Michi, 2023. "Optimal financing and investment strategies under asymmetric information on liquidation value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
10. Graham, John R. & Kim, Hyunseob & Leary, Mark, 2020. "CEO-board dynamics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 612-636.
    • John R. Graham & Hyunseob Kim & Mark T. Leary, 2019. "CEO-Board Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 26004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
11. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2020. "Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
12. Achim, Peter & Knoepfle, Jan, 2024. "Relational enforcement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    • Peter Wagner & Jan Knoepfle, 2021. "Relational Enforcement," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_295, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
13. Shiming Fu & Giulio Trigilia, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure under dynamic moral hazard," 2018 Meeting Papers 448, Society for Economic Dynamics.
14. Rodivilov, Alexander, 2022. "Monitoring innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 297-326.
15. Tak-Yuen Wong, 2019. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4032-4048, September.
16. Felix Zhiyu Feng & Wenyu Wang & Yufeng Wu & Gaoqing Zhang, 2023. "Ignorance Is Bliss: The Screening Effect of (Noisy) Information," Papers 2302.11128, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
17. Orlov, Dmitry, 2022. "Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
18. Zhiyao Chen & Ilya A. Strebulaev & Yuhang Xing & Xiaoyan Zhang, 2021. "Strategic Risk Shifting and the Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle: An Empirical Investigation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 2751-2772, May.
19. Zhiyao Chen & Ran Duchin, 2024. "Do Nonfinancial Firms Use Financial Assets to Take Risk?," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(1), pages 1-37.
20. Nirav Mehta, 2019. "Measuring quality for use in incentive schemes: The case of “shrinkage” estimators," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(4), pages 1537-1577, November.
    • Nirav Mehta, 2017. "Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators," University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP) Working Papers 201725, University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP).
    • Mehta, Nirav, 2018. "Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of “Shrinkage” Estimators," EconStor Preprints 180846, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Nirav Mehta, 2018. "Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators," CESifo Working Paper Series 7163, CESifo.
21. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2023. "Termination as an incentive device," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
22. Niu, Yingjie & Zou, Zhentao, 2024. "Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 196-217.
23. Barbos, Andrei, 2019. "Dynamic contracts with random monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-16.
    • Andrei Barbos, 2016. "Dynamic Contracts with Random Monitoring," Working Papers 0416, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
24. Aaron Finkle & Dongsoo Shin, 2020. "Obstructive monitoring," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 873-891, October.
25. Dylan Possamai & Nizar Touzi, 2020. "Is there a Golden Parachute in Sannikov's principal-agent problem?," Papers 2007.05529, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
26. Peter Achim & Jan Knoepfle, 2025. "The Tension between Trust and Oversight in Long-term Relationships," Papers 2504.02696, arXiv.org.