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Robust dynamic implementation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Andrés Perea & Elias Tsakas, 2019. "Limited focus in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 571-607, June.
  2. Pierfrancesco Guarino, 2025. "Topology-free type structures with conditioning events," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(4), pages 1107-1166, June.
  3. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
  4. Müller, Christoph, 2020. "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  5. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & De Vito, Nicodemo, 2021. "Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
  6. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
  7. Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "One-step-ahead implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 110-126.
  8. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2025. "Incentive compatibility and belief restrictions," Economics Working Papers 1918, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  9. Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas, 2023. "Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 503-514.
  10. Manili, Julien, 2024. "Order independence for rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 152-160.
  11. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-453, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  12. Guarino, Pierfrancesco, 2020. "An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 257-288.
  13. Chopra, Anand & Gavan, Malachy James & Penta, Antonio, 2026. "Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  14. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  15. Ollar, Mariann & Penta, Antonio, 2024. "Incentive Compatibility and Belief Restrictions," TSE Working Papers 24-1558, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  16. Perea, Andrés, 2025. "Dynamic consistency in games without expected utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
  17. Perea, Andrés, 2018. "Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 120-138.
  18. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2025. "Incentive Compatibility and Belief Restrictions," Working Papers 1513, Barcelona School of Economics.
  19. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017. "Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection," CARF F-Series CARF-F-416, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  20. Catonini, Emiliano, 2020. "On non-monotonic strategic reasoning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 209-224.
  21. Perea, Andrés, 2017. "Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 489-516.
  22. Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2017. "Uncertain information structures and backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 135-151.
  23. Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Manili, J., 2023. "Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 527-551.
  24. Meier, Martin & Perea, Andrés, 2025. "Reasoning about your own future mistakes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 302-328.
  25. Andrés Perea & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2019. "An epistemic approach to stochastic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 181-203, March.
  26. Makris, Miltiadis & Renou, Ludovic, 2023. "Information design in multi-stage games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
  27. Antonio Penta & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2022. "Rationalizability, Observability, and Common Knowledge," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(2), pages 948-975.
  28. Martin Meier & Andres Perea, 2024. "Forward Induction in a Backward Inductive Manner," Department of Economics Working Papers 99/24, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
  29. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
  30. Michele Lombardi & Ritesh Jain & Antonio Penta, 2024. "Strategically Robust Implementation," Working Papers 1461, Barcelona School of Economics.
  31. Safronov, Mikhail, 2018. "Coalition-proof full efficient implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 659-677.
  32. Andrés Perea, 2025. "Expected utility as an expression of linear preference intensity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 98(4), pages 561-598, June.
  33. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi & Antonio Penta, 2024. "Strategically robust implementation," Economics Working Papers 1893, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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