IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/jaecon/v60y2015i2p65-96.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

The revolving door and the SEC’s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Jagan Krishnan & Jayanthi Krishnan & Steven A. Maex, 2024. "Does audit firm hiring of former PCAOB personnel improve audit quality?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 3130-3175, December.
  2. Kuvvet, Emre & Maskara, Pankaj Kumar, 2018. "Former members of the U.S. Congress and fraud enforcement: Does it help to have politically connected friends on the board?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 77-89.
  3. Gow, Ian D. & Wahid, Aida Sijamic & Yu, Gwen, 2018. "Managing reputation: Evidence from biographies of corporate directors," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 448-469.
  4. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2020. "The job rating game: Revolving doors and analyst incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 41-67.
  5. Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2018. "The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A View from Accounting Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 12775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Jonas Heese & Gerardo Pérez-Cavazos & Andreya Pérez-Silva, 2024. "Human bias in the oversight of firms: evidence from workplace safety violations," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 3413-3448, December.
  7. Trevor Incerti, 2025. "How firms, bureaucrats, and ministries benefit from the revolving door: Evidence from Japan," Papers 2509.22173, arXiv.org.
  8. Donelson, Dain C. & Kubic, Matthew & Toynbee, Sara, 2024. "The SEC's September spike: Regulatory inconsistency within the fiscal year," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2).
  9. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working Papers 2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
  10. Amiraslani, Hami & Donovan, John & Phillips, Matthew A. & Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina, 2023. "Contracting in the Dark: The rise of public-side lenders in the syndicated loan market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1).
  11. Moehrle, Stephen R. & Franzen, Laurel & Meckfessel, Michele & Reynolds-Moehrle, Jennifer, 2016. "Developments in accounting regulation: A synthesis and annotated bibliography of evidence and commentary in the 2015 academic literature," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 96-108.
  12. Horton, Joanne & Serafeim, George & Wu, Shan, 2017. "Career concerns of banking analysts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 231-252.
  13. Yang Bao & Bin Ke & Bin Li & Y. Julia Yu & Jie Zhang, 2020. "Detecting Accounting Fraud in Publicly Traded U.S. Firms Using a Machine Learning Approach," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 58(1), pages 199-235, March.
  14. Heese, Jonas & Krishnan, Ranjani & Ramasubramanian, Hari, 2021. "The Department of Justice as a gatekeeper in whistleblower-initiated corporate fraud enforcement: Drivers and consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1).
  15. Holzman, Eric R. & Marshall, Nathan T. & Schmidt, Brent A., 2024. "When are firms on the hot seat? An analysis of SEC investigation preferences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1).
  16. Jian Zhang & Ningzhi Wang & Xinyu Zhu & Xiao Yi, 2024. "Does the supply of tax information affect financial restatements? Evidence from the launch of Taxation Administration Information System III in China," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-13, December.
  17. Mehta, Mihir N. & Zhao, Wanli, 2020. "Politician Careers and SEC enforcement against financial misconduct," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2).
  18. Jongsub Lee & Tao Li & Donghwa Shin, 2022. "The Wisdom of Crowds in FinTech: Evidence from Initial Coin Offerings," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 11(1), pages 1-46.
  19. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2017. "The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst Incentives," Working Papers 258, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
  20. Jonas Heese, 2022. "Does Industry Employment of Active Regulators Weaken Oversight?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 9198-9218, December.
  21. Josafat I. Hernández Cervantes, 2024. "Moral decay, inequality, and the perception of corruption: the reproduction of bribery as a social norm," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 23(1), pages 123-143, December.
  22. Wang, Ping & Wang, Xiaochun & Wu, Jie, 2023. "Executives' regulatory experiences and corporate social responsibility," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(PB).
  23. Sophie A. Shive & Margaret M. Forster, 2017. "The Revolving Door for Financial Regulators," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(4), pages 1445-1484.
  24. Adam William Chalmers & Robyn Klingler‐Vidra & Alfio Puglisi & Lisa Remke, 2022. "In and out of revolving doors in European Union financial regulatory authorities," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1233-1249, October.
  25. Leone, Andrew J. & Li, Edward Xuejun & Liu, Michelle, 2021. "On the SEC's 2010 enforcement cooperation program," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1).
  26. Silano, Filippo, 2022. "Revolving doors in government debt management," ILE Working Paper Series 61, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
  27. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2020. "The European Commission and the revolving door," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  28. Schantl, Stefan F. & Wagenhofer, Alfred, 2020. "Deterrence of financial misreporting when public and private enforcement strategically interact," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1).
  29. Hayes, Rachel M., 2015. "Discussion of “The revolving door and the SEC׳s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation” by DeHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2015)," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 1-7.
  30. Silano, Filippo, 2022. "The effectiveness of revolving door laws: Evidence from government debt management," ILE Working Paper Series 63, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
  31. Richard A. Cazier & Jianning Huang & Fuzhao Zhou, 2024. "Regulatory spillover effects in OTC markets," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 3600-3632, December.
  32. Hills, Robert & Kubic, Matthew & Mayew, William J., 2021. "State sponsors of terrorism disclosure and SEC financial reporting oversight," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1).
  33. Asai, Kentaro & Kawai, Kei & Nakabayashi, Jun, 2021. "Regulatory capture in public procurement: Evidence from revolving door bureaucrats in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 328-343.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.