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Revenue maximization with a single sample

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Sukanya Kudva & Edward Dowling & Anil Aswani, 2025. "Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information," Papers 2511.12456, arXiv.org, revised May 2026.
  2. Thomas Nedelec & Clément Calauzènes & Vianney Perchet & Noureddine El Karoui, 2022. "Revenue-Maximizing Auctions: A Bidder’s Standpoint," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 2767-2783, September.
  3. Hedyeh Beyhaghi & Linda Cai & Yiding Feng & Yingkai Li & S. Matthew Weinberg, 2025. "Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity," Papers 2506.09291, arXiv.org.
  4. Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes, 2025. "On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 73(3), pages 1659-1674, May.
  5. Moshe Babaioff & Michal Feldman & Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Brendan Lucier & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2020. "Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer," Papers 2003.05913, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
  6. Han, Jun & Weber, Thomas A., 2023. "Price discrimination with robust beliefs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 306(2), pages 795-809.
  7. Xiaotie Deng & Yanru Guan & Ningyuan Li & Zihe Wang & Jie Zhang, 2025. "Ex-Ante Truthful Distribution-Reporting Mechanisms," Papers 2507.04030, arXiv.org.
  8. Bergemann, Dirk & Castro, Francisco & Weintraub, Gabriel, 2022. "Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 275-291.
  9. Hailong Sun & Xiaobo Li & Chung-Piaw Teo, 2025. "Partition and Prosper: Design and Pricing of Single Bundle," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 73(4), pages 1983-2001, July.
  10. Duarte Gonc{c}alves & Bruno A. Furtado, 2024. "Statistical Mechanism Design: Robust Pricing, Estimation, and Inference," Papers 2405.17178, arXiv.org.
  11. Andrew Komo & Scott Duke Kominers & Tim Roughgarden, 2024. "Shill-Proof Auctions," Papers 2404.00475, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
  12. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  13. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Mishra, Debasis, 2022. "Selling two identical objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  14. Yash Kanoria & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2021. "Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 509-524, March.
  15. Dirk Bergemann & Francisco Castro & Gabriel Weintraub, 2019. "Uniform Pricing Versus Third-Degree Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2213r, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2020.
  16. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
  17. Mahsa Derakhshan & Negin Golrezaei & Renato Paes Leme, 2022. "Linear Program-Based Approximation for Personalized Reserve Prices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(3), pages 1849-1864, March.
  18. Tim Roughgarden & Inbal Talgam-Cohen & Qiqi Yan, 2019. "Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 1074-1094, July.
  19. Hedyeh Beyhaghi & Negin Golrezaei & Renato Paes Leme & Martin Pál & Balasubramanian Sivan, 2021. "Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 1805-1822, November.
  20. José Correa & Dana Pizarro & Gustavo J. Vulcano, 2024. "The Value of Observing the Buyers’ Arrival Time in Dynamic Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(4), pages 2107-2121, April.
  21. Çağıl Koçyiğit & Garud Iyengar & Daniel Kuhn & Wolfram Wiesemann, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 159-189, January.
  22. Hemant K. Bhargava & Gergely Csapó & Rudolf Müller, 2020. "On Optimal Auctions for Mixing Exclusive and Shared Matching in Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(6), pages 2653-2676, June.
  23. Shixin Wang, 2023. "The Power of Simple Menus in Robust Selling Mechanisms," Papers 2310.17392, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  24. Amine Allouah & Omar Besbes, 2020. "Prior-Independent Optimal Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(10), pages 4417-4432, October.
  25. Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes, 2023. "Robust Auction Design with Support Information," Papers 2305.09065, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
  26. Amine Allouah & Achraf Bahamou & Omar Besbes, 2022. "Pricing with Samples," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(2), pages 1088-1104, March.
  27. Jin Xi & Haitian Xie, 2021. "Strength in Numbers: Robust Mechanisms for Public Goods with Many Agents," Papers 2101.02423, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
  28. Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes, 2022. "On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design," Papers 2204.10478, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
  29. Haitian Xie, 2020. "Finite-Sample Average Bid Auction," Papers 2008.10217, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
  30. Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen & Yingkai Li, 2025. "Scale-robust Auctions," Papers 2510.21231, arXiv.org.
  31. Shixin Wang, 2025. "The Power of Simple Menus in Robust Selling Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(6), pages 5268-5287, June.
  32. You Zu & Krishnamurthy Iyer & Haifeng Xu, 2025. "Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 73(1), pages 194-208, January.
  33. Jin Xi & Haitian Xie, 2023. "Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 649-683, October.
  34. Çağıl Koçyiğit & Daniel Kuhn & Napat Rujeerapaiboon, 2024. "Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder, Multi-Item Auctions," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 36(6), pages 1543-1561, December.
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