Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects
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- Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke, 2017.
"On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 27-43.
- HIRATA, Daisuke & KASUYA, Yusuke, 2015. "On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts," Discussion Papers 2015-10, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- HIRATA, Daisuke & KASUYA, Yusuke, 2016. "On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016-13, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Kawasaki, Ryo, 2015. "Roth–Postlewaite stability and von Neumann–Morgenstern stability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1-6.
More about this item
Keywordsstrategy-proofness; second-best incentive compatibility; top trading cycles rules; deferred acceptance rules;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-03-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2014-03-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2014-03-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2014-03-22 (Microeconomics)
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