IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Why Do Women Favor In-group Competition? Evidence From an Incentive Compatible Choice Experiment


  • Schmitt, Norma
  • Beblo, Miriam
  • Beninger, Denis
  • Schröder, Melanie


This paper identifies a woman's self-confidence to boost her competition willingness independently from the gender-mix of the competitor's group. We conduct an incentive compatible online choice experiment with 883 non-standard subjects, 442 of them female, with competition-free and competition-involving choice sets that ruled inter alia the gender-related composition of the competitors group. Our framed field experimental setting demonstrates that indeed the participating women are more eager to engage in same-gender than in mixed-gender competition. However, if a woman is revealed to be self-confident, she is more engaged in competition even against a mixed-gender group with gender-differences in competition disappearing. Our interpretation is twofold: On the one hand, we confirm a woman's competition ability, whereas on the other, we must admit that this is driven by the strength of her self-concept.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmitt, Norma & Beblo, Miriam & Beninger, Denis & Schröder, Melanie, 2015. "Why Do Women Favor In-group Competition? Evidence From an Incentive Compatible Choice Experiment," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113145, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113145

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113145. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.