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Welche Unternehmen berufen Vorstandsvorsitzende und andere Vorstände als externe Kontrolleure? Eine empirische Analyse der Präsenz von externen Vorständen in den Aufsichtsräten deutscher Großunternehmen

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  • Buchwald, Achim

Abstract

Die Berufung externer Vorstände in das interne Kontrollgremium stellt eine gängige Praxis zwischen Großunternehmen dar. Insbesondere die deutsche Unternehmenslandschaft war über Jahrzehnte durch ein komplexes Netz personeller Verflechtungen über Vorstands- und Auf-sichtsratsgremien gekennzeichnet. In dem vorliegenden Beitrag werden erstmals systematisch unternehmensspezifische Faktoren für die Präsenz externer Vorstände in deutschen Aufsichtsräten und zeitliche Entwicklungstendenzen anhand eines aktuellen Datensatzes für den Zeitraum 1997 bis 2008 empirisch analysiert. Unter anderem nimmt die Präsenz externer Vorstände im Aufsichtsrat mit der Unternehmensgröße und dem Stimmrechtsanteil der Unternehmen aus dem untersuchten Datensatz zu. Die getrennte Auswertung unterschiedlicher Gruppen von externen Vorständen im Aufsichtsrat zeigt, dass externe Vorstandsvorsitzende im Vergleich zu anderen externen Vorstandsmitgliedern signifikant häufiger Mandate in erfolgreicheren, stärker diversifizierten sowie gelisteten Unternehmen ausüben. Schließlich wird der Einfluss der Kontrollvariablen auf die Präsenz externer Vorstände vor und nach der Reform des Steuerrechts im Jahr 2002 untersucht.

Suggested Citation

  • Buchwald, Achim, 2011. "Welche Unternehmen berufen Vorstandsvorsitzende und andere Vorstände als externe Kontrolleure? Eine empirische Analyse der Präsenz von externen Vorständen in den Aufsichtsräten deutscher Großunternehm," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 3/2011, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:32011
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    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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