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Corruption and Political Competition


  • Damania, Richard
  • Yalcýn, Erkan


There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition merely serves to alter the type of corruption that eventuates, but cannot eliminate it.

Suggested Citation

  • Damania, Richard & Yalcýn, Erkan, 2008. "Corruption and Political Competition," Economics Discussion Papers 2008-7, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7128

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dash, Bharatee Bhushan & Mukherjee, Sacchidananda, 2013. "Does Political Competition Influence Human Development? Evidence from the Indian States," Working Papers 13/118, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.

    More about this item


    Corruption; lobbying; political competition;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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