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Comparative Statics And Laws Of Scarcity For Games

Author

Listed:
  • Kovalenkov, Alexander

    (Department of Economics, University of North Carolina)

  • Wooders, Myrna

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

Abstract

A 2law of scarcity2 is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity for cores and approximate cores of games. Furthermore, we demonstrate conditions under which all payoffs in the core of any game in a parametized collection have an equal treatment property and show that equal treatment core payoff vectors satisfy a condition of cyclic monotonicity. Our results are developed for parameterized collections of games and exact bounds on the maximum possible deviation of approximate core payoff vectors from satisfying a law of scarcity are stated in terms of the parameters describing the games. We note that the parameters can, in principle, be estimated. Results are compared to the developments in the literature on matching markets, pregames and general equilibrium. This paper expands on results published in Kovalenkov and Wooders, Economic Theory )to appear).

Suggested Citation

  • Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2004. "Comparative Statics And Laws Of Scarcity For Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 715, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:715
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    File URL: https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp715.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cartwright, Edward & Conley, John & Wooders, Myrna, 2005. "The Law of Demand in Tiebout Economies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 734, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    2. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Market games and clubs," MPRA Paper 33968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2010.
    3. Allouch, Nizar & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 246-278, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monotonicity ; cooperative games ; clubs ; games with side payments (TU games) ; cyclic monotonicity ; laws of scarecity ; law of demand ; approximate cores ; effective small groups ; parameterized collection of games;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition

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