Land-use agreements when the developer is not sure of infrastructure costs
Planners wish to avoid a lawsuit by the developer over their cost estimates of the public works required by his project. To avoid a suit, they can offer him his choice of several sets of conditions that would attach to land-use permits. In computer simulations of five such short- and long-term contracts, the developer chooses a ``development agreement" -- characterized here as a long-term contract in which the developer pays an impact fee and obtains a freeze on taxes and regulations -- in more than 97\% of the cases.
|Date of creation:||15 Oct 1998|
|Date of revision:||24 Oct 1998|
|Note:||Type of Document - LaTex; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP;|
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- Leon Taylor, 1991. "Deceptive Developers, Competitive Zoning Boards, And The Asymmetry Of Information," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 261-275, Fall.
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