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Land-use agreements when the developer is not sure of infrastructure costs


  • Leon Taylor

    (Dillard University)


Planners wish to avoid a lawsuit by the developer over their cost estimates of the public works required by his project. To avoid a suit, they can offer him his choice of several sets of conditions that would attach to land-use permits. In computer simulations of five such short- and long-term contracts, the developer chooses a ``development agreement" -- characterized here as a long-term contract in which the developer pays an impact fee and obtains a freeze on taxes and regulations -- in more than 97\% of the cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Leon Taylor, 1998. "Land-use agreements when the developer is not sure of infrastructure costs," Public Economics 9810005, EconWPA, revised 19 Apr 2003.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9810005
    Note: Type of Document - LaTex; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP;

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Leon Taylor, 1991. "Deceptive Developers, Competitive Zoning Boards, And The Asymmetry Of Information," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 261-275, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Leon Taylor, 1998. "When will the developer pay an impact fee?," Public Economics 9810004, EconWPA, revised 19 Apr 2003.

    More about this item


    land use;

    JEL classification:

    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

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