IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Decentralized Investment and Quality Decisions In Common-Pool Networks


  • Manuel A. Abdala

    (LECG, LLC)

  • Pablo T. Spiller

    (University of California, Berkeley)


Investment and quality decisions in common-pool networks are typically governed by rules set by a centralized agency (either a monopoly or a regulator). In network systems where competition has flourished, decentralized solutions work better than centralized ones. Rent seeking and politicization is avoided at lower costs. Problems of free riding and entry barriers may remain, but improved self-governance procedures and antitrust supervision can handle them. Two illustrations from the electricity sector are presented here: FREBA in Buenos Aires province, Argentina; and MACQS, in New Zealand. These examples show how decentralized mechanisms may develop throughout network utilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel A. Abdala & Pablo T. Spiller, 2005. "Decentralized Investment and Quality Decisions In Common-Pool Networks," Public Economics 0508004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0508004
    Note: Type of Document - doc; pages: 22

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Littlechild, Stephen C. & Ponzano, Eduardo A., 2008. "Transmission expansion in Argentina 5: The regional electricity forum of Buenos Aires province," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1491-1526, July.
    2. Stephen C. Littlechild & Carlos J. Skerk, 2004. "Regulation of transmission expansion in Argentina Part I: State ownership, reform and the Fourth Line," Working Papers EP61, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.

    More about this item


    electricity transmission; network; power pool; electricity market; investment;

    JEL classification:

    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0508004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.