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# Matching games with partial information

## Author

Listed:
• Paolo Laureti Yi-Cheng Zhang

## Abstract

We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized {\it Marriage Problem}, comparing the benefits obtained by self-searching and by a matchmaker. Finally we propose a modified matching game intended to mimic the way consumers' information makes firms to enhance the quality of their products in a competitive market.

## Suggested Citation

• Paolo Laureti Yi-Cheng Zhang, 2003. "Matching games with partial information," Game Theory and Information 0307002, EconWPA.
• Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0307002
Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on linux; to print on PostScript; pages: 19; figures: included. Published on Physica A 324(1- 2) 49-65 (2003)
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File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/0307/0307002.pdf

File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/0307/0307002.ps.gz

## References listed on IDEAS

as
1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
2. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Rankin, Frederick W, 1997. "On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 576-596, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

## Citations

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Cited by:

1. Tilles, Paulo F.C. & Ferreira, Fernando F. & Francisco, Gerson & Pereira, Carlos de B. & Sarti, Flavia M., 2011. "A Markovian model market—Akerlof’s lemons and the asymmetry of information," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(13), pages 2562-2570.

### Keywords

Asymmetric information; Marriage Problem; Bounded rationality;

### JEL classification:

• C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
• C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

### NEP fields

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