# Matching games with partial information

## Author Info

Listed author(s):
• Paolo Laureti Yi-Cheng Zhang

## Abstract

We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized {\it Marriage Problem}, comparing the benefits obtained by self-searching and by a matchmaker. Finally we propose a modified matching game intended to mimic the way consumers' information makes firms to enhance the quality of their products in a competitive market.

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File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/0307/0307002.pdf

File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/0307/0307002.ps.gz

## Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0307002.

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 Length: 19 pages Date of creation: 16 Jul 2003 Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0307002 Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on linux; to print on PostScript; pages: 19; figures: included. Published on Physica A 324(1- 2) 49-65 (2003) Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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