The Localisation of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
The evolution of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma depends on the conditions under which the game is played. The results of a series of computer simulations show that the emergence of cooperative play in the game is strongly affected by the localisations of both interaction and learning. While the localisation of learning promotes mutual cooperation, the localisation of interaction has an ambiguous effect on it. Moreover, the localisation of learning seems to promote disequilibrium behaviour in the system.
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|Date of creation:||Aug 1996|
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Web page: http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/working-papers.html
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