Supervising mandatory funded pension systems : issues and challenges
The regulation and supervision of pension funds is a critical part of building public confidence in a funded-pension system. This report argues that confidence is best bolstered by an independent, autonomous, and transparent supervision agency, particularly when previous systems have failed. The choice between proactive and reactive supervision depends on previous experience of self-regulation in a country's financial sector. This report examines four key areas of supervision in derail: institutional, financial, membership, and benefits control. It looks at collection of contributions, asset valuation, portfolio limits, custodianship, and benefit guarantees. New data are presented on the performance of supervision agencies in and on marketing and operation costs of new pension funds in Latin America. Comparative data for OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries are also included.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433|
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/spl
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Palacios, Robert & Whitehouse, Edward, 1998.
"The role of choice in the transition to a funded pension system,"
Social Protection and Labor Policy and Technical Notes
20109, The World Bank.
- Palacios, Robert & Whitehouse, Edward, 1998. "The Role of Choice in the Transition to a Funded Pension System," MPRA Paper 14176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vittas, Dimitri, 1998. "Regulatory controversies of private pension funds," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1893, The World Bank.
- Rofman, Rafael & Demarco, Gustavo, 1999. "Collecting and transferring pension contributions," Social Protection and Labor Policy and Technical Notes 20122, The World Bank.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:hdnspu:20113. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Raiden C. Dillard)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.