Which market protocols facilitate fair trading?
We study the performance of four market protocols with regard to their ability to equitably distribute the gains from trade among two groups of participants in an exchange economy. We test the protocols by running (computerized) experiments. Assuming Walrasian tatonemment as benchmark, there is a clear-cut ranking from best to worst: batch auction, nondiscretionary dealership, the hybridization of a dealership and a continuous double auction, and finally the pure continuous double auction.
|Date of creation:||May 2007|
|Publication status:||Published in A. Consiglio (ed.), Artificial Markets Modeling, Springer, 2007, 81-97|
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