IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods


  • Hakan Inal

    (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business & Center for Public Policy, L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs)


Ausubel's dynamic private-values auction for heterogeneous discrete goods, Ausubel (2006), yields an efficient equilibrium outcome but it is designed for a limited class of environments. If bidders' values for bundles of goods are not integers, then the auction mechanism may not yield an efficient allocation without any information on bidders' values. In this paper, I extend Ausubel's auction for heterogeneous discrete goods to real-valued quasilinear utility functions. The mechanism I propose reaches a Walrasian equilibrium price vector in finite "steps" without any additional information on bidders' values. In the extension of Ausubel's auction, truthful bidding constitutes an efficient equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Hakan Inal, 2010. "An Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods," Working Papers 1005, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:vcu:wpaper:1005

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: First version
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Auctions; Ausubel auction; heterogeneous goods; discrete goods; price adjustment; tatonnement.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vcu:wpaper:1005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oleg Korenok (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.