A Comparison of estimators for Empirical Models of Auction
Using structural econometric models of equilibrium behaviour in games with incomplete information to intrepret field data from auctions has become increasingly widespread. Several different estimation strategies now exist. In this paper, I compare the performance of these different estimators using a stylized empirical model of a procurement auction within the independent private values paradigm.
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|Date of creation:||1992|
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