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Non-Cooperative Solutions for Claims Problems


  • Atlamaz, M.
  • Berden, C.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Peters, H.J.M.

    (RS: GSBE ETBC, Quantitative Economics)

  • Vermeulen, A.J.

    (Quantitative Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC)


In a claims problem an estate has to be divided among several claimants whose total claim exceeds the size of the estate. This paper extends the noncooperative approach, initiated by O’Neill (1982), by allowing players to put multiple claims on the same part of the estate, and by considering the case where individual claims may exceed the estate. A full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria is obtained both for restricted claims problems, where individual claims do not exceed the estate, and for the general case. Variations on the claim game are considered, which result in proportional division in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Atlamaz, M. & Berden, C. & Peters, H.J.M. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2008. "Non-Cooperative Solutions for Claims Problems," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008038
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2008038

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    Cited by:

    1. Aleksander Aristovnik & Matevž Meze, 2017. "The impact of supranational fiscal rules on public finance: the case of EMU member states," Global Business and Economics Review, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 19(1), pages 38-53.

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