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Branded Websites and Marketplace Selling: Competing during COVID-19

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Abstract

I consider a market for differentiated products with an online marketplace (the platform) and two types of firms. Marketplace firms sell through the platform. Branded firms sell to consumers directly and, if they choose, through the platform. When a branded firm joins the platform, the firm expands its reach beyond its branded website/physical store(s) to consumers who visit the platform for all their purchases. The drawback is that the firm has to pay a referral fee for all sales on the platform, some of which are from its loyal consumers who would otherwise have purchased from the firm directly. I investigate the role of the firm composition in determining the equilibrium outcome. Interestingly, a higher fraction of branded firms translates into more firms on the platform and intense price competition. In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, consumers who used to shop at physical stores turn to the platform. I show that if they do (do not) consider other products, more (fewer) branded firms will join the platform in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Oksana Loginova, 2022. "Branded Websites and Marketplace Selling: Competing during COVID-19," Working Papers 2202, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  • Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:2202
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    Cited by:

    1. Shuilin Liu & Xudong Lin & Xiaoli Huang & Hanyang Luo & Sumin Yu, 2023. "Research on Service-Driven Benign Market with Platform Subsidy Strategy," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-21, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    price competition; online marketplace platform; brands; consumer shopping behavior; COVID-19;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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