IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/umc/wpaper/1312.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Public's Right To Know Versus Compelled Speech: What Does Social Science Research Tell Us About The Benefits And Costs Of Campaign Finance Disclosure In Non-Candidate Elections?

Author

Abstract

We review the arguments and evidence for compelled financial disclosure by groups engaged in grassroots issue advocacy or active in ballot measures elections. There is no anti-corruption rationale for disclosure requirements, since these activities do not directly affect candidates for elective office. That leaves only an informational rationale for disclosure in non-candidate contexts. However, there is little evidence that the public utilizes information disclosed by such regulations, or even that disclosure adds to the stock of more readily available and salient information. In contrast, a growing literature documents that there are non-trivial costs of compliance to these regulations, especially for newer or informal citizen coalitions. We conclude with a discussion of the lessons from the social science literature for practical reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Milyo & Dick Carpenter, 2013. "The Public's Right To Know Versus Compelled Speech: What Does Social Science Research Tell Us About The Benefits And Costs Of Campaign Finance Disclosure In Non-Candidate Elections?," Working Papers 1312, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  • Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:1312
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BcR9gQxoIQc_Ai3k7KObDco-XGQfTsbf/view?usp=sharing
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public corruption; campaign finance; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:1312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chao Gu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/edumous.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.