Sincere Versus Sophisticated Voting When Legislators Vote Sequentially
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- Tim Groseclose & Jeffrey Milyo, 2013. "Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 745-751, March.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ladha, Krishna K, 1994. "Coalitions in Congressional Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 43-63, January.
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- Bolle, Friedel, 2017. "Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules," Discussion Papers 394, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
More about this item
- A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-10-01 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2011-10-01 (Positive Political Economics)
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