Winner's Curse Corrections Magnify Adverse Selection
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Keywordswinner's curse; adverse selection; common-value auctions; procurement; product quality;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-12-19 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2009-12-19 (Microeconomics)
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