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Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Mechanism Design Approach

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Abstract

In this paper we use mechanism design approach to find the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.

Suggested Citation

  • Oksana Loginova & X. Henry Wang & Haibin Lu, 2006. "Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Mechanism Design Approach," Working Papers 0608, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 15 Jun 2006.
  • Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:0608
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    File URL: https://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2006/wp0608_loginova_wang.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    peer-to-peer networks; mechanism design.;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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