Relative Performance Evaluation, Risk Aversion and Entry
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KeywordsExecutive Compensation; Relative Performance Evaluation; Moral Hazard; Market Structure.;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-07-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-07-07 (Business Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2007-07-07 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2007-07-07 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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