Best-reply matching in Akerlof’s market for lemons
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Keywordsbest-reply matching; experience goods; signalling game; mixed Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; extensive form; normal form.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-03-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2007-03-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2007-03-10 (Microeconomics)
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