Political Costs and Fiscal Benefits: The Political Economy of Residential Property Value Assessment
In many American states and municipalities, property taxes are the primary means of raising government revenues. Unlike sales or income taxes, however, property taxes have a significant element of subjectivity - the assessed value of the property being taxed. Given this subjectivity, there exists the possibility of political and fiscal incentives entering into property value assessment. We examine the determinants of assessed property value growth in a panel of 351 Massachusetts municipalities from 1995 to 2009. We hypothesize that the year to year growth of assessed value is in part determined by the municipalityï¿½s fiscal condition, the availability of alternative revenue sources, and whether the municipalityï¿½s property assessor is directly elected or appointed by an elected official. We find evidence that elected assessors respond to both the fiscal benefits and political costs of increasing their assessment of property values. Appraisals grow faster in towns with appointed assessors and respond to temporary raises in the cap on tax revenues with increases in appraisal growth.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2010|
|Date of revision:||Aug 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Towson, Maryland 21252-0001|
Web page: http://www.towson.edu/cbe/departments/economics/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tow:wpaper:2010-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Juergen Jung)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.